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INTRODUCTION
Every day countless lives are saved by drugs produced by
pharmaceutical companies. These life-saving drugs demonstrate the
incredible medical advances that can be achieved through research and
development. These drugs, however, do not come cheaply. Pharmaceutical
companies expect high returns from their successful drugs and rely on
profits generated through patents to recoup the sunk costs of research and
development. 1
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has set an international
standard for patent protection, to which all members are expected to
conform. India, however, has recently come under scrutiny for imposing its
own narrow interpretation of patent rights and stands accused of violating
its obligations as a WTO Member.
In 2005, India denied Swiss pharmaceutical Novartis a patent for its
cancer drug Glivec because it did not demonstrate "enhanced efficacy" as
required by Section 3(d) of the Indian Amended Patents Act of 1970.2
Novartis challenged this decision by appealing to both the Indian Patent
Office and the Indian judicial system.
On August 6, 2007, the Indian High Court of Madras ruled against
Novartis, holding that Section 3(d) of the Indian Amended Patent Act of
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Northwestern University. I wish to give special thanks to my
family for their lifelong and uncompromising support of each and every one of my
endeavors. I would also like to thank Professor Alexia Brunet for her insight and assistance
with this paper. Finally, I would like to thank Susan McHugh, David Matthews, and the
Journal staff for their outstanding editorial help. Any and all errors are attributable solely to
myself.
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Debating Pharmaceutical
IPRs-A Joint UNCTAD-Stockholm Network Event, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 20, 2007,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-totip/docs/ditepcbb-ias0048-en.pdf.
2 Indian Patent Office, In the matter of application for Patent No. 1602/MAS/98, Jan. 25,
2006 [hereinafter IPO Decision].
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1970 (Patent Act) was constitutional. Additionally, the Court held that it
had no authority to decide whether or not this Section was in violation of
the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS). 4 The Novartis challenge was the first case to directly
confront the Amended Indian Patent Act, and its result has confirmed that
Indian courts interpret patent laws quite narrowly.
The decision came as a relief to human rights organizations and a
disappointment to the pharmaceutical industry.5  Human rights
organizations feared that a broad reading of the Patent Act would have a
detrimental impact on a key Indian industry-generic pharmaceuticals.
6
This industry is pivotal in providing low cost drugs not only to the general
Indian population, but also to developing countries that do not have the
capabilities of producing drugs themselves, and whose citizens cannot
afford the high price of name-brand drugs.7
Pharmaceutical companies worried that a narrow interpretation of
Indian patent law would result in fewer patents being issued. This in turn
would reduce the incentive to invest in research and development, and
could potentially stifle the development of improved drugs. 8
This comment proposes that cultural preferences have had a strong
influence over the development of Indian patent law, and that these
preferences influenced the court decision against Novartis. Part I will
introduce TRIPS and international patent law, discuss the development of
Indian patent law in the context of its colonial past and WTO membership,
and explain the decisions by the Indian Patent Office and the Court of
Madras in the context of Glivec's development. Part II will explore WTO
attitudes and approaches to TRIPS and argue that if Switzerland were to
bring India to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Board (DSB), it would be
unsuccessful due to the liberal nature of TRIPS and the DSB's history of
giving discretion to individual countries to interpret their TRIPS
obligations. Part III will conclude by arguing that despite the Glivec
decision, pharmaceutical investment in India will not be stifled, but
continue to grow due to the relatively low cost of investment and highly
skilled work force.
3 Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (Madras H.C.).
4 Id. para. 8.
5 Amelia Gentleman, Indian Law on Generic Drugs is Upheld, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug.
6, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=7005552.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. The incentive mentioned by pharmaceuticals is money obtained from the exclusive
rights to their patented drugs. Id.
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I. THE DECISIONS OF INDIA'S PATENT OFFICE AND COURT ARE
NOT SURPRISING WHEN VIEWED IN CONTEXT WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PATENT LAW
A. Intellectual Property Rights and TRIPS Generally
The purpose of an intellectual property right is to give social and
economic recognition to people for the creations of their minds. 9 As
international trade has increased over recent decades and ideas are more
frequently exchanged in global arenas, the need for harmonized intellectual
property laws has emerged. The push for harmonization culminated in the
formation of the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of Intellectuals Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPS).10 TRIPS came into force on January 1, 1995
as a result of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round Negotiations." TRIPS
recognizes seven classes of intellectual property rights: (1) copyright and
related rights; (2) trademarks; (3) geographical indications; (4) industrial
designs; (5) patents; (6) layout designs of integrated circuits; and (7)
protection of undisclosed information.'
Particularly, TRIPS Article 27.1 provides that "patents shall be
available for any inventions ... provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application."13  Article 27.2
provides that members may deny patents to the extent necessary to protect
"ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life
or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environent .... 4The term
of exclusivity articulated by Article 33 is twenty years counted from the
date of filing. 5
Once TRIPS came into force, developing countries, such as India,
were given a period of five years to harmonize their patent laws with
TRIPS.1 6 India took the full five years and then a five year extension
before becoming fully compliant. 17 As of January 1, 2005, India amended
9 Praveen Dalal, Indian Patent Law-Some Reflections, IPFRONTLINE.COM, July 25, 2006,
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id= 11882&deptid=6; WTO-TRIPS-What
Are Intellectual Property Rights?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips_e/intelle.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
10 WTO-TRIPS-What are Intellectual Property Rights?, supra note 9.
11 WTO-TRIPS-Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/trips-e/tripfq-e.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter WTO FAQ].
12 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights, Jan. 1, 1995, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
13 Id. at art. 27.1.
14 Id. at art. 27.2.
'5 Id. at art. 33.
16 WTO FAQ, supra note 11.
17 Id.
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its Patent Act in an effort to be fully compliant with TRIPS.' 8 One question
raised by Novartis, and explored by this comment, is whether or not India is
in fact fully compliant with TRIPS.
B. Indian Culture had a Strong Influence on the Development of Patent Law
India's strong anti-patent sentiment is clearly illustrated by Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's recent assertion that "[t]he idea of a better-
ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents
and there will be no profiteering for life and death."' 19 Traditionally, Indian
knowledge has not been protected through legal means.20 In fact,
knowledge sharing is the norm in India. For example, Indian classical
music is not copyrighted, Bollywood scripts closely mimic U.S. films, and
until 1995, pharmaceutical drugs could not legally be patented.2' One
result of India's cultural and legal tendencies against protecting intellectual
property is the development of a thriving generic drug industry.22 This
industry uses reverse-engineering to copy patented drugs and produce them
at very low cost.23 The strong generic industry is a direct result of highly
protectionist Indian patent law.
1. India's Colonial History Influenced Its Attitude Toward Patent
Protection
India was an English colony until 1947.24 Prior to its independence,
India's patent laws were based on those found in England and were
embodied in the Indian Patents and Design Act of 1911.25 Under this
system, eighty to ninety percent of India's patents came to be held by
foreigners. 6 Concerned that foreigners would gain undue influence over
India's economy, in 1948 (and again in 1957) Prime Minister Jawaharla
Nehru formed a government committee to evaluate the patent system.27
The committee results asserted that India's patent system was allowing
foreigners to "achieve monopolistic control over the market" in major
18 Id.
19 Indira Gandi, Address Before the World Health Assembly, Geneva (May 1982), in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 186 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
20 Suketa Mehta, Owning Om, YOGA AND JOYFUL LIvING, Dec. 2007, at 68.
21 Id.; WTO FAQ, supra note 11.
22 Stephen Barnes, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and








industries such as food, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.28 Specifically
with regard to pharmaceuticals, the committee found that the general public
was unable to afford medications and the drug-price index was increasing.
29
In response to these findings India passed the Patent Act of 1970.3o
This Act's purpose was to prevent patentees from enjoying a monopoly
over a patented article, and to protect and prioritize the public interest.
1
Through this Act, India set forth a protectionist agenda aimed at promoting
Indian business and establishing strong domestic industries.
The Patent Act of 1970 created a very weak system for protecting
pharmaceuticals in particular. In fact, drugs could not be patented.32 The
Act only allowed for the patenting of "process claims covering methods of
their manufacture., 33  This provision allowed for a robust generic
pharmaceutical industry to develop.34
By using reverse engineering and slightly altering the production
processes of patented drugs, Indian generic pharmaceuticals were able to
create less expensive versions of the patented drugs that were then
distributed to the greater population.3 5 Additionally, patents expired after a
term of five years from the date of issue or seven years from the date of
filing, whichever was shorter.36 The results of this system were impressive.
At the time of independence, India's pharmaceutical industry was
insignificant.37  By the 1990's however, "Indian companies control[led]
seventy percent of the domestic formulations market and eighty-five
percent of the bulk drugs market. 38
2. WTO Membership Caused a Shift in Indian Patent Law, but Not in Indian
Attitudes
After India joined the WTO in 1995, it was required to bring its own
patent laws up to the standard set forth by TRIPS. Because the WTO set
out extended deadlines for developing countries such as India, it was able to
postpone TRIPS compliance until January 1, 2005, ten years after its





33 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005.
34 Juan Bacalski, Mexico's Pharmaceutical Patent Dilemma and the Lesson of India, 23
ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 717, 728-29, 734 (2006).
" Id. at 718.
36 Barnes, supra note 22, at 921.
31 Id. at 924.
38 Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the
TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 527 (1996).
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joining. 39  Although a transition period was allowed, India assumed
immediate obligations that required specific provisions be initiated to
ensure patent application priority and exclusive marketing rights. India's
failure to legally implement these changes lead to two WTO disputes.4 °
In 1996 and 1997, parallel complaints brought by the United States
and the European Community challenged India's compliance with TRIPS
under Articles 70.8 and 70.9.41 The complaints alleged that India failed to
implement both a legally sufficient "mailbox system" within the meaning of
TRIPS Article 70.8, and a system of exclusive marketing rights under
Article 70.9.42
The United States argued that "[b]ecause India had failed to establish a
fully functional mailbox system that granted mailbox applications the legal
status required by the TRIPS Agreement as of their priority filing date, large
numbers of applications that would have been filed were currently being
withheld until India established such a system., 43  India asserted that its
current "mailbox system," based solely on administrative practice and which
had not been formalized by Indian law, was sufficient to fulfil its TRIPS
obligations. The panel held that India's "mailbox system" was inconsistent
with TRIPS Article 70.8 because it did not offer a "means" by which patent
applications could securely be filed. Likewise, the panel found India in
violation of Article 70.9 by offering no means of exclusive marketing rights
for the interim period between filing a patent application and being granted or
denied a patent.
Political reaction to the panel's findings illustrates India's resistance to44
changes in their patent law. Lawmakers agreed that no amendments would
be made to Indian law without a consensus and one opponent of change
stated "[w]e will see that pressure applied by external forces does not affect
our independent decision." 
4 5
India appealed the decision of the panel and the appellate body
39 Prabhu Ram, India's New "TRIPS-Compliant" Patent Regime Between Drug Patents
and the Right to Health, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195, 195 (2006).
40 Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998); Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997);
Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/ABiR (Dec. 19, 1997). Because the complaints were almost
identical, this comment will refer solely to the U.S. complaint, DS50.
41 Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50iR (Sept. 5, 1997).
42 Id.
43 Id. para. 5.4.





affirmed.46  As a result of these decisions, India passed the Patents
(Amendment) Act of 1999, which brought its patent law into conformity with
the panel findings.47 The political reaction and resistance to change is not
surprising given India's long journey toward compliance. 48 Although India
had putatively been in full compliance with the requirements set forth by
TRIPS as of 2005, 4 9 Novartis' challenge to India's Patent Act has called
India's compliance into question.
3. Section 3(d) of India's Patents Act is Raising Questions Relating to Both
Indian and WTO Law
Section 3(d) is at the heart of discussions questioning India's
compliance with TRIPS. Despite the controversy surrounding Section 3(d),
Novartis' challenge is the only one to have been brought before the Indian
courts. 50 Due to its vague, and potentially very limiting meaning, Section
3(d) was challenged by Novartis as being contrary to both local Indian law
and WTO international law.
Section 3(d) provides that:
The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance
or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known
substance or the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at
least one new reactant.
Explanation-for the purpose of this clause, salts, esters, ethers,
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures
of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they
46 Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/7 (Dec. 19, 1997).
47 Status Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/1O/Add.3 (Mar. 9, 1999).
48 Ram, supra note 39. India's Parliament insisted on a ten year transition period to
TRIPS compliance. Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of
Drug Patents in India, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 599, 615 (2004).
49 WTO FAQ, supra note 11.
50 Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India-Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to
Medicines, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 541, 542 (2007). Other controversial provisions of the
Amended Patent Act of 1970 include the Compulsory Licensing requirement (allowing the
government to grant a license to an Indian firm to produce a patented drug without the
consent of the patent owner) and the Mailbox Application provisions (offering no protection
to patent applications filed between 1995-2005 against infringers aside from the payment of
"reasonable royalties" by the manufacturer of the generic version of the drug). The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005.
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differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.
5 1
According to this provision, a known drug cannot be patented unless
the "known efficacy" of the substance has been enhanced. The Act
provides no test or guidelines for determining enhanced efficacy.
One of the primary purposes for this provision was to prevent the
evergreening of a patent. The process of evergreening occurs when a
company makes a change to a patented product through "incremental
innovation," and thus obtains a new patent for its product. 53  Through
evergreening pharmaceutical companies are able to extend the life of their
patents, thereby protecting money invested in research and development.
India has used the "enhanced efficacy" concept to differentiate genuine
innovation from evergreening.54 Although the High Court stated that
efficacy could be defined as "the ability of a drug to produce a desired
therapeutic effect," the Court failed to define any factors to differentiate the
genuine innovation from mere incremental innovation unworthy of a
patent. 
55
Although proponents of human rights organizations have commended
efforts to reduce evergreening, representatives of the pharmaceutical
industry argue that without recognition of incremental innovation
pharmaceutical companies will lose the incentive to invest in the research
and development of patented drugs and "patients will be denied new and
better medicines., 56  Pharmaceutical companies argue that breakthrough
innovations, though important, are rare,57 and that it is through incremental
innovations that many important advances are made. Examples of
incremental innovation include improved safety and effectiveness of the
drug, fewer side effects, greater stability during storage and transport, and
new formulations of the product aimed at specific patient groups such as
children. 58 Additionally, it is argued that without strong patent protection,
the Indian pharmaceutical industry will be unable to transform from a
51 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d).
52 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759; Novartis Patent Challenge Dismissed in India, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE DIG. NEWS, Sept. 5, 2007, http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/7819/
[hereinafter Novartis Dismissed].
53 Gentleman, supra note 5.
54 Novartis Dismissed, supra note 52.
" Id.; Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759.
56 Novartis Dismissed, supra note 52.
57 Press Release, PhRMA, Indian Court Decision Weakens Incentives for New






generic leader into an innovator. 59 Despite strong arguments against India's
current interpretation of Section 3(d), India's treatment of patent
applications is unlikely to change unless Switzerland complains
successfully to the WTO.
C. Novartis Was Unsuccessful in Its Application to the Indian Patent Office
and in Its Judicial Challenge
Following the development of Glivec, Novartis took steps to obtain a
patent in India. Its efforts were unsuccessful and resulted in an appeal to
the Indian Patent Office as well as the Indian Courts.
1. The History of Glivec
Glivec is a drug developed by the Swiss pharmaceutical company
Novartis and is used to treat two specific types of cancer: chronic myeloid
leukemia and gastrointestinal stromal tumors.60  Glivec6' is based on the
molecule imatinib.62 In 1993, Novartis obtained patents in the United
States as well as the European Patent Office for synthesizing the molecule
imatinib.63 Novartis later developed "the mesylate salt of imatinib and then
the beta crystal form of imatinib mesylate to make it suitable for patients to
take in pill form., 64 Glivec was launched globally in 2001 and is the only
form of Glivec marketed to date.65
When imatinib was developed in 1992, it was ineligible for a patent in
India because pharmaceutical products were not offered such protection.66
At that time India did not offer protection for drugs themselves.67 The only
protection offered was a patent for the exact process used to create the
drug.68  The "beta crystalline" form of the molecule was developed for
patients to take as a pill and launched as Glivec in 2001.69
59 Id.
60 Novartis, Glivec Patent Case in India: FACT vs. FICTION, http://www.novartis.com
/downloads/about-novartis/facts-vs-fiction-india-glivec-patent-case.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2009) [hereinafter FACT vs. FICTION].
6 1 Glivec is marketed as "Gleevec" in the United States. See Novartis Pharmaceuticals,
http://www.novartis.com/products/pharmaceuticals.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
62 Novartis, Addressing Innovation Dilemmas in Emerging Markets: Glivec Case
Advances Debate in India, http://www.novartis.com/downloads/newsroomI/Dilemmas-in_
emerging-markets-Glivec.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Addressing
Innovation].
63 IPO Decision, supra note 2, at 2.
64 FACT vs. FICTION, supra note 60.
65 id.
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Because of its status as a developing country, India was not required to
comply fully with TRIPS until 2005. 0 In the interim period between 1995,
when TRIPS came into force, and 2005, when India was required to be fully
TRIPS compliant, India introduced a system of "exclusive marketing
rights."71  Novartis was granted exclusive marketing rights for Glivec,
which allowed it to market and sell Glivec exclusively for five years or until
its patent application was either accepted or rejected by the Indian Patent
Office (IPO), whichever was earlier.72 The attainment of exclusive
marketing rights did not guarantee Novartis a patent and was strictly a
function of procedure mandated by the WTO.73
2. Novartis Unsuccessfully Attempted to Patent Glivec in India
Once India was fully compliant with TRIPS, the IPO began
considering previously filed patent applications such as Novartis'
application for Glivec. Novartis' application for Glivec was denied. 74
Cancer Patients Aid Association, India (CPAA) formally opposed the
patent application.75 Novartis' denial was based on three conclusions made
by the IPO: (1) imatinib mesylate was a known substance that was
disclosed as imatinib in patents issued in the United States and other
countries in 1993; (2) the discovery of imatinib mesylate was "obvious";
and (3) imatinib mesylate did not meet the Section 3(d) "enhanced efficacy"
requirement. 76
Arguing that imatinib mesylate was an unknown substance, Novartis
claimed that (1) the free base previously patented as "imatinib" had been
changed into a salt form, and (2) a particular crystal form of the salt had
been made through human intervention.77 CPAA claimed that imatinib
meyslate salt "inherently existed" in the substance patented as imatinib.
Novartis countered by claiming that the 1993 patent for imatinib did not
"disclose imatinib mesylate, but merely the corresponding free base."
78
70 Ram, supra note 39.
71 Infra Part I.B.ii.
72 Intellectual Property Office India, Exclusive Marketing Rights,
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/emr.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009); Addressing
Innovation, supra note 62.
73 Infra Part I.B.ii.
74 IPO Decision, supra note 2. Novartis has appealed this decision and is awaiting a final
determination by the Indian Patent Office. Addressing Innovation, supra note 62.
75 Id. at 1. This intervention highlights the tension between those advocating liberal
patent laws in India for economic reasons and those who favor a more protectionist
perspective for human health reasons.





The Patent Office rejected Novartis' argument.79
CPAA attacked Novartis' application on further grounds citing
obviousness. CPAA claimed that once the free base was disclosed in the
1993 Patent, it would have been "obvious for a person skilled in the art to
prepare corresponding pharmaceutically acceptable salts." 80  Despite
Novartis' objection that the 1993 patent disclosed "only the free base, and
not any salt of imatinib," the IPO agreed with CPAA that imatinib mesylate
did not satisfy the non-obvious requirement.
81
Finally, the IPO addressed Section 3(d). 82 Pursuant to Section 3(d) of
the Patents Act, "any salt, polymorph or derivative of known substance is
not patentable unless such ... substance shows enhanced efficacy.' 83
Novartis put forth an affidavit by an expert comparing the "relative
bioavailability of the free-base with that of the B-crystal form of imatinib
mesylate" and found that there was a thirty percent difference in
bioavailability. 84 To support its argument that imatinib mesylate was a new
product (and more than the "mere discovery of a new form of a known
substance"), Novartis argued that the crystal form was not an inherent
property of imatinib and that human intervention was necessary to bring
about this new compound. 85 The IPO held that the patent application
offered a new form of a known substance and did not demonstrate any
improvement in efficacy.8 6 The IPO rejected the, application.
The decision by the patent officer has been appealed and a final
decision is pending.
D. Novartis Unsuccessfully Appealed to the Indian Courts
In 2006, in response to the IPO's rejection of its patent application,
Novartis filed two writ petitions. One petition challenging the decision of
the patent board is ongoing. The second petition asked the court to declare
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Amendment Act unconstitutional and
noncompliant with TRIPS.87
79 Examining the 1993 patent, the Office found that claims 6 to 23 claimed a
"pharmaceutically acceptable salt of the base compound." IPO Decision, supra note 2.
These points were important to the Patent Office, convincing it that imatinib mesylate was a
known substance from the prior applications and is in fact a normally occurring substance in
the registered form of imatinib. Id.
80 IPO Decision, supra note 2.
81 Id
82 Id.
83 Id. In an affidavit Novartis notes that "the proviso to the section 3(d) is unique to India
and there is no analogous provision in the law of any other country of the world." Id.
84 IPO Decision, supra note 2.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759.
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Novartis challenged Section 3(d) of the Amended Patent Act of 1970
on two grounds. They first argued that Section 3(d) was not compliant with
TRIPS. Next, they argued that Section 3(d) was unconstitutional. 89 After
much discussion regarding the compliance of Section 3(d), the court held
that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether or not Section 3(d) was
TRIPS compliant. 90 It then went on to hold that Section 3(d) did not violate
India's Constitution.9'
1. TRIPS Compliance
Novartis' main contention was that Section 3(d) violates Article 27 of
TRIPS. Article 27 states that products and processes that are "new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application" are worthy of
patents. 92 Article 1(1) of TRIPS provides that "[m]embers shall give effect
to the provisions of this Agreement." 93 Novartis argued that because the
introduction of Section 3(d) prevented a new form of a known substance
from being patented, a right granted under TRIPS Article 27 was taken
away. 
94
Defenders of Section 3(d) argued that it is indeed compliant under
TRIPS. Counsel proposed that each member country is given enough
"elbow room to bring in a local law in discharging their obliation under
'TRIPS' having regard to the various needs of their citizens." Emphasis
was placed on the fact that India is a "welfare count9T" and that its first
obligation is to its citizens and their good health. 9  Counsel argued
successfully that, even if Section 3(d) were not found compliant, the Indian
courts would have no authority to offer a remedy. 97 Instead, the DSB of the
WTO was the correct body to resolve this issue.
The Court held that according to Article 64 of TRIPS and the structure
of the agreement, disputes were intended to go through the DSB. As stated
by the Court:
When such a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism is
provided as indicated above and when it cannot be disputed that it is
binding on its member States, we see no reason at all as to why the
88 Id. para. 1.
89 Id.
90 Id. para. 8.
91 Id. para. 10.
92 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 27(1).
9' Id. at art. 1(1).
94 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759, para. 3.
95 Id. para. 4.
96 Id.
97 Id. para. 8.
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petitioner, which itself is part of that member State, should not be
directed to have the dispute resolved under the dispute settlement
mechanism referred to above.
98
In order for this question to be resolved, Novartis will need to petition
the Swiss government to bring a formal complaint against India to the WTO
DSB. Novartis' cause does not currently appear to be on the Swiss
government's agenda, but this may change in the event of future adverse
patent decisions. 99
2. Constitutional Challenge
Novartis' constitutional attack attempted to prove that Section 3(d)
offended Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. 100 In rendering its decision,
the Court put great emphasis on parliamentary intent. The Court concluded
that Section 3(d) was not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, and
that the effects of Article 14 were within the scope of parliamentary
intention.
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution confers the right to equality
before the law. 101 It states "[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India." 10 2  Novartis argued that because there are no guidelines to
understand "enhanced efficacy," uncontrolled discretion is given to the
patent controller. 10 3 This "arbitrary exercise of power" is a violation of
Article 14.104 Novartis' argument was rejected by the Court.1 °5 The Court
held that Article 14 could only be invoked when it was clear that in the
exercise of discretionary power there was a possibility of "real and
substantial discrimination."' 0 6  In upholding the discretion granted to
controllers by the Act, the Court stated that "[w]e cannot presume that the
authorities will administer the law 'with an evil eye and an unequal
hand.'°
10 7
In evaluating the effect and scope of Section 3(d) the Court gave much
weight to protectionist sentiments previously expressed by Parliament. The
98 Id.
99 Andrew Jack, Novartis to Move Indian R&D, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d5a403c-5048-11 dc-a6bO-0000779fd2ac.html.
'00 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759, para. 3.
101 INDIA CONST. art. 14.
102 Id.
103 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759, para. 1.
104 Id.
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Court referred to Parliamentary debates surrounding the adoption of the
Amended Patent Act of 1970.108 Many feared that by amending patent laws
to be more favorable to pharmaceutical companies, the general population
could be denied access to vital medications.10 9 The Court noted that in
Parliament's view, the Act was designed to "safeguard the economic
interests of this country. . . and must be viewed with greater latitude."
' 10
The Court found that Section 3(d) was an accurate reflection of
Parliamentary intent to limit the number of patents available to
pharmaceutical companies and a conscious effort to curb evergreening.
The Court went on to examine the efficacy requirement and its
application to Glivec. The Court defined efficacy as "the ability of a drug
to produce the desired therapeutic effect" and noted that in the field of
pharmacology efficacy is "independent of potency of the drug."11  The
Court found that the proper test for determining enhanced efficacy is to
compare the details of the new substance looking to be patented with the
old substance. If upon comparison the properties differ significantly with
regard to efficacy, then a patent should be granted. 
112
The decision mentioned no factors for making the relevant
comparison, leading to ambiguity in the analysis. For example, according
to Novartis, Glivec has a thirty percent increase in bioavailability over the
108 Id.
109 Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759. The Court notes that the amended Section 3(d) no doubt
resulted from the debates held in Parliament and was a response to public health concerns.
Id.
110 Id. para. 18. Prior to amendment, Section 3(d) read "the mere discovery of any new
property of new use of a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant." The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1972, at § 3(d). The amended
Section 3(d) reads:
[T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of
any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known
process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product
or employs at least one new reactant.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 at § 3(d). In
response to Parliamentary debate, the original amendment (under Ordinance 7/2004), which
arguably would have been in clear TRIPS compliance, was abandoned in favor of the section
now under dispute. Surprisingly, the court implied that perhaps Section 3(d) is not in fact
compliant with TRIPS. Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759, para. 10. The court referred to the
amended section as "drafted in a great hurry [] realizing that [it] is likely to be struck down
on the grounds that it is incompatible with 'TRIPS'...." Id.





original form of imatinib.113 As required by the Court, and seemingly by
the Patent Office, this is a proven form of increased efficacy. This change,
however, was not deemed an adequate change in efficacy as determined by
the IPO.
The Court made clear that Parliamentary intent influenced its decision.
The language repeated by the Court implied a desire to maintain the spirit
of traditional patent law while bringing the Patent Act (arguably) into
TRIPS conformity.
II. TRIPS INTERPRETATIONS ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY AMONG
WTO MEMBER COUNTRIES
Prior to the Uruguay Round negotiations there was no specific
agreement on intellectual property rights within the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).11 After pressure from the United States and
other countries to create a harmonized standard of intellectual property
rights, TRIPS was agreed on and came into force for all WTO members as
of January 1, 1995.1 5 TRIPS does not require individual members to have
identical intellectual property laws. Instead, TRIPS sets a minimum
standard for protection of intellectual property rights to which members
must conform. 116  Members are free to implement laws that are more
extensive than TRIPS as long as those laws do not "contravene the
provisions of the agreement." 117
A. Textual Arguments Support the Contention that TRIPS Allows
Individual Members Discretion for the Implementation of Intellectual
Property Law
If Switzerland decides to bring a complaint against India to the DSB, it
is unlikely that the DSB would find India in violation of TRIPS. While
TRIPS sets an international minimum standard, it aims to allow members
flexibility and discretion. There are three provisions within TRIPS that
enhance this argument and bolster India's decision to interpret its patent
obligations narrowly: (1) the preamble; (2) Article 1 (1); and (3) Article 7.1 18
The preamble of TRIPS begins by recognizing "the underlying public
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual
113 IPO Decision, supra note 2.
H4 WTO FAQ, supra note 11.
15 Id. Note that the time table given to each country varied by their status as a
developed, undeveloped or least developed country. Also, extensions were given to
countries that needed more time, as was the case with India.
116 id.
117 Id.
118 TRIPS, supra note 12.
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property, including developmental and technological objectives."'1 19 This
statement acknowledges that each member will have individual needs that
must be met and accounted for on a case by case basis. In regard to India,
primary concerns are protecting the generic industry and the continued
production of low cost drugs.
Article 1(1) notes that "[m]embers shall give effect to the provisions of
this Agreement. '1 20  Novartis contended that by implementing a strict
interpretation of "enhanced efficacy," India did not give full effect to the
provisions of TRIPS and was therefore in violation of its obligation as a
member. Article 1 goes on to say, however, that "[m]embers shall be free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the Rrovisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice."' This provision
again breathes discretion into TRIPS, by allowing members flexibility.
India enacted a policy of being tough on patent applicants. Though this is
considered a loss to pharmaceutical companies, human rights organizations
applaud such efforts. 
122
Article 7 of TRIPS articulates the objective of TRIPS:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to balance of rights
and obligations. 123
By qualifying the protection of intellectual property rights as being in
"a manner conducive to social and economic welfare," TRIPS again
119 Id. at Preamble.
120 Id. at art. 1(1).
121 Id.
122 Despite the negative reaction to the decision by pharmaceutical companies, many non-
governmental organizations have supported the Indian court's interpretation of their patent
laws. Gentleman, supra note 5. As a leader in the production of generic drugs, India plays a
vital role in providing cheap medications-especially for AIDS-to undeveloped countries
that can neither afford to pay the price for pharmaceutical drugs nor produce the drugs on
their own. Id. The decision by the court has been called "a huge relief' by many health
activists who feared that a wide view of the Indian Patent Act would halt India's production
of inexpensive medicines distributed to the poor. Novartis Dismissed, supra note 52. In
fact, nearly half a million people, including former Swiss President Ruth Dreifuss,
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and members of the European Parliament and the United States
Congress, signed a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) petition urging Novartis to drop the
case. Id. MSF purchases eighty-four percent of the AIDS drugs it distributes from Indian
generic producers. The organization worried that a ruling in favor of Novartis would have
reduced the production of affordable medicines in India that it considers vital to the
treatment of diseases throughout the developing world. Id.
123 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 7.
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illustrates flexibility. The defense in the Novartis case referenced Article 7
as "providing enough elbow room to a member country" to balance
individual property rights with the greater social and economic needs of the
country. 1
24
Considering the effect of these three provisions, the DSB would likely
determine that India had exercised appropriate discretion to advance its
policy favoring low cost drugs at the expense of granting pharmaceutical
patents.
B. The DSB Has Allowed Member Countries Latitude in Interpretating
Their TRIPS Obligations
The DSB has shown two general approaches when evaluating
violations of TRIPS. The first is an inflexible mandate that the explicit
obligations set forth by TRIPS must be obeyed. The second approach is
more flexible and allows discretion sufficient to fulfill members'
interpretations of certain ambiguous TRIPS obligations. Because of the
nature of the Section 3(d) controversy, if a complaint were to be filed
against India in the WTO, the DSB would likely evaluate India using the
more flexible approach.
When there is a clear violation of the explicit TRIPS obligations, the
DSB reacts to enforce the letter of the law. In Canada-Term of Patent
Protection,1 25 the United States challenged Canada's interpretation of
TRIPS Article 70.1 and 70.2, whereby Canada did not grant a full twenty
year period of exclusivity for patents issued prior to TRIPS' enactment.
Under Canada's prior Patent Act, effective before Canada came into
compliance with TRIPS, patents were granted exclusive rights for a term of
seventeen years. 27 The panel noted the distinction between Article 70.1 's
statement that TRIPS did not trigger obligations in respect to "acts" that
occurred before the date of compliance, and Article 70.2's imposition of
TRIPS obligations on "rights" existing prior to the agreement. 2 8 The panel
held that patents that existed prior to TRIPS were "rights," thus
guaranteeing patent protection for twenty years.129  Following this
determination, the panel found Article 33 obligations unambiguous in
defining the terms of patent protection for twenty years from the filing
124 See Novartis, 2007 A.I.R. 24759, para. 4.
125 Panel Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS70/R (May 5, 2000), affid
Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS I 70/AB/R (Sept. 18,
2000).
126 Panel Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, paras. 6.2, 6.25, WT/DS170/R
(May 5, 2000).
127 Id. paras. 2.1, 2.7.
128 Id. paras. 3.1-3.2.
129 Id.
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date. 130 This case illustrates the DSB's intolerance for explicit deviations
from TRIPS obligations.
A second case brought against Canada illustrates the DSB's more
lenient approach, which allows individual members latitude to interpret
ambiguous provisions of TRIPS. In Canada-Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, the European Community (EC) challenged
Section 55.2(1) of Canada's Patent Act. 131 This provision allowed potential
competitors of a patent owner to use a patented item (without authorization
and during the term of the patent) for the purpose of obtaining regulatory
permission to sell the product upon expiration of the patent. 132  Three
TRIPS Articles were examined in this matter: Article 27.1, Article 30 and
Article 28.1.'3
The EC challenged that by allowing competitors to obtain government
approval for products prior to the patent's expiration, Canada was in
violation of Article 27.1 which states that "patents shall be available...
without discrimination .... 134 Canada argued, and the panel agreed, that
it was within its right to limit the patent rights conferred. 35 Canada relied
on Article 30 which provides that:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interest of third parties.
The DSB found that the EC's rights were not unreasonably restricted
and that Canada was exercising permissible discretion.137 Following the
panel's determination that Canada's actions were within its Article 30
exclusionary rights, the panel dismissed the EC's argument that Canada was
failing its Article 28 obligation to confer exclusive rights to a patent
owner. 138
It is likely that, if brought in front of the DSB, India's case would be
evaluated with leniency because the Section 3(d) controversy is more
130 Id. paras. 7.1-7.2.
131 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 1 14/R
(Mar. 12, 2000).
132 Id. paras. 2.1-2.7.
133 Id. paras. 3.1-3.2.
134 Id. para. 3.1.
131 Id. para. 3.2.
136 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 30.
137 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, paras. 3.1-





closely related to the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case than Canada-
Term of Patent Protection. The reason for this is that Section 3(d) involves
an interpretation of India's TRIPS obligations and not a strict conflict with
an explicit provision. In the context of Article 27.1, the DSB could easily
determine that the "enhanced efficacy" requirement is a permissible test for
the "innovative step" requirement. It is also likely that the DSB would
view India's choices in light of Article 27.2, which allows a member to
limit patents for the purpose of protecting public health. Given the DSB's
prior decisions, India would likely be found compliant with its TRIPS
obligations.
III. THE NOVARTIS DECISION SHOULD NOT HAVE A LARGE
EFFECT ON PHARMACEUTICAL INVESTMENT IN INDIA
Following Novartis' adverse court decision, Daniel Vasella, Chief
Executive of Novartis, commented that his "concrete plans" for investment
in research in India would be directed elsewhere:
This is not an invitation to invest in Indian research and
development, which we would have done. We will invest more in
countries where we have protection. It's not a punishment. It's just
a question of the culture for investment. Do you buy a house if you
know people will break in and sleep in your bedroom?
39
Despite these strong words, it is unlikely that the Novartis decision
will curb investment in India. Firms have approached India with caution
since the 1970s. After the Indian government reduced patent protection in
1970, many firms left India and invested elsewhere. 40 Although there has
been increased interest in investing in India following its 2005 compliance
with TRIPS, firms have been cautious.' 4  The recent Novartis case justifies
such cautious attitudes, but it also signals to firms the direction in which
India plans to take its new patent law. Armed with this knowledge,
pharmaceutical companies will be able to tailor their investments to
maximize the benefit they can extract from India while minimizing their
risk.
A. India is Competitive on the Global Market
Controversy over the Novartis decision has led to speculation that
India will lose pharmaceutical investment opportunities to countries such as
39 Jack, supra note 99.
140 Andrew Jack & Amy Yee, China May Prove a Hard Pill for India to Swallow, FIN.




International Law & Business 29:577 (2009)
China. 142 Following India's long period without strong patent protection,
investment in India, even prior to the Novartis decision, had been
cautious. 143 Now, although it will continue to compete with countries such
as China for investment, many of India's attributes, such as low production
costs and an educated work force, will continue to attract companies to
invest in research and development within its borders and continue to make
it a competitive choice for pharmaceutical investment. 1
44
Since India's new patent laws came into effect in 2005, it has been
competing directly with countries such as China and Singapore 145 for
pharmaceutical investment. Throughout this period, however, these two
other countries have enjoyed greater investment due to their stronger patent
protection regimes. 146 Still, at least a dozen companies have chosen to
invest in India since it amended its patent laws in January 2005.147 The
following chart 148 serves as a snapshot of investment in India by
pharmaceutical companies: 149
Company Area of Focus Investment
Allegan Inc. Inflammatory, infection, $3-5 Million
urological indications
Eisai API process $120 Million
Pharmaceuticals (including
manufacturing plants)
Dupont Molecular biology, bio- $23 Million
informatics, and polymer
synthesis
Ratiopharm Basic processes $36 Million (in two
GmbH phases)
Teva Basic processes $3-4 Million
AstraZeneca TB &NCE research, $15 Million
process & development
BMS-Syngene Basic drug discovery N/A
Pliva Basic studies for generics $1 Million
142 Id.
143 Id.
'44 Jack, supra note 99.
145 Id.
146 Id.







Nektar Pre-clinical and bio- $10 Million
Therapeutics analytical development
Though some of these investments seem small, it has been noted that
the number of partnerships with local companies outnumbers those in China
and Singapore. 150 This is significant because local partnerships stimulate
growth and innovation by local firms, which in turn contribute greatly to
local economies. 151 The "Indian pharmaceutical industry has carved out a
unique place on the global map, not only as a manufacturer of generic drugs
but also of new formulations, with growing emphasis on research and
development and new drug discovery .... ,,52 In addition, the Indian
pharmaceutical industry is ranked fourth globally in terms of volume, with
"annual turnover of over US $ 11 billion" and an eight percent share in the
world pharmaceutical market. 
153
It is important to view Indian pharmaceutical investment in the context
of its past patent history. When the Indian Patent Act was amended in
1970, many foreign companies left due to the lack of patent protection.
154
Following the 2005 changes to patent law, companies are once again
considering India a viable option for investment. 155  Concerns over
implementation of these new laws, as illustrated by the Novartis case, have
kept investors cautious, but money is beginning to flow back into the
country. 156 Some drug makers have formed "research-based" partnerships
with Indian companies. For example, pharmaceutical giant
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) has recently teamed up with local Indian company
Ranbaxy to conduct early-stage drug development. 157 In fact, GSK has
consistently increased the number of clinical studies it has conducted in
India, going from three leading up to 2005 to sixteen in 2006, to
150 Id.
151 World Business Counsel for Sustainable Development, The Role of the Health Care
Sector in Expanding Economic Opportunity, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.inclusive
business.org/2008/08/the-role-of-the.html (summarizing ADEEB MAHMUD & MARCIE
PARKHURST, THE ROLE OF THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 1N EXPANDING ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY SERIES (Harvard University 2007) available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/reporL2 1/EO%2OHealth%2OCare%
20Final.pdf).
152 Favourable Global Trends for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, INDIA CHRONICLE,
Nov. 2007, at 03, http://www.sunmediaonline.com/indiachronicle/nov07/investment
update.html.
153 Id.
154 Jack & Yee, supra note 140.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Utkarsh Palnitkar, Drug Discovery in India-Trends and Challenges, EXPRESS
PHARMA, May 16-31, 2008, http://www.expresspharmaonline.com/20080531/research
02.shtml.
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approximately thirty-one in 2007.158 Trials carried out in India are typically
forty to sixty percent cheaper than in the United States and quicker because
patients can be enrolled more rapidly than in the United States. 159 Though
enthusiasm for investment has been tempered with caution over India's
patent laws,1 60 it is unlikely that this hesitation will completely detract from
the many positive incentives that India can offer companies willing to
invest in pharmaceutical development.
B. India's Strongest Asset is Its Workforce
The strength of India's workforce is perhaps its greatest asset in
attracting foreign pharmaceutical investment. 161  Ajit Dangi, director
general of the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI),
noted:
Some companies may be concerned about issues like data
exclusivity, which is allowed in about 40-50 countries but not in
India. Similarly, Section 3(d) of the Patent Act lacks clarity and this
also may be a concern. But that need not deter them from investing
in India as there are other factors involved while taking business
decisions. 162
One factor that weighs heavily in favor of India's continued receipt of
foreign investment is the large number of English-speaking engineers and
scientists who are willing to work for relatively low wages. IN India, in
fact, produces more university graduates than the United States, and
roughly forty percent of Indian university graduates hold degrees in science
or engineering. 164 A large draw for companies is the Indian Institute of
Technology (1IT). This university was founded by former Prime Minister
Nehru and its graduates are highly sought after. 16 IIT is one of the most
selective universities in the world, accepting about 2500 of over 100,000
who take the entrance exam every year.' A well-educated, English-
speaking population willing to work for comparatively low wages is
certainly an attractive feature offered by India to investors.
.8 P.T. Jyothi Datta, GSK Doubles Clinical Trials, HINDU Bus. LINE, Nov. 26, 2007,
available at http://www.tiehindubusinessline.com/2007/11/26/stories/2007112651470
300.htm.
159 Jack & Yee, supra note 140.
160 Id.
161 Gupta, supra note 48, at 615.
162 Jayakumar, supra note 147.
163 Gupta, supra note 48, at 626-27.





Additionally, investors can look to India's thriving generics industry to
provide well-educated workers with highly relevant experience. Though
the primary research and development of the generics industry consists of
reverse-engineering, new patent laws will encourage firms to utilize India's
educated workforce. Many of the skills and much of the process knowledge
required for reverse-engineering is directly applicable to the discovery
167
process.
Although concerns over India's patent laws will influence
pharmaceutical investment, these sentiments are not new. Despite the fact
that the Novartis case affirmed some fears regarding India's patent law, it
also provided information to pharmaceutical companies that will allow
them to invest in India to their advantage. The hospitable environment
offered by India will continue to attract international pharmaceutical
investment.
CONCLUSION
The Novartis case presented the Indian Court with an opportunity to
defy the cultural and political trends toward weak patent protection. Instead
of paving the way for a new era of strong patent protection, the Court
maintained the Indian tradition of protectionism. The decision of India's
High Court, however, is not surprising given India's traditional culture and
protectionist past. Despite the controversy surrounding Section 3(d), it is
unlikely that the WTO would find India in violation of TRIPS because of
the wide discretion given to member countries by the language of TRIPS.
Though the Novartis case has stirred up a great deal of publicity,
pharmaceutical investment in India is likely to continue at its current pace.
Although the Novartis decision will not serve as a beacon to new investors,
it is not an unexpected result-India's history of weak enforcement has
long led foreign firms to exercise caution when investing in India. The
many draws to investing in India, primarily its exceptional work force, will
continue to court pharmaceutical investors and will result in continued
growth in that sector.
167 Id. at 630.
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